[After a mild
start, it ended up being a long, cold, wintry winter. But all winters end, metaphorically
as well as seasonally, and in this week’s series I’ll be AmericanStudying a few
cultural and historical such American thaws—leading up to a weekend post on one
of our most recent warmings.]
On how a
longstanding animosity began to change, and why the specifics matter.
Thanks to popular
cultural texts from Paul
Revere’s ride to Mel
Gibson’s Revolution, it seems to me that even the most history-phobic
Americans are likely to have a sense that our nation began through hostile
conflict with the British. Thanks to a burning White House and a
flag that was still there,
many Americans might even know that we fought another significant war with the
same British foe only a few decades after the Revolution. And the animosity
between the new United States and its former colonial mother country didn’t end
with the War of 1812—from the anti-European import of the Monroe Doctrine
to border disputes between the two countries in Maine
and Oregon, and
through the extended British flirtations with allying
with the Confederacy during the Civil War, the 19th century was
marked by consistent diplomatic chilliness punctuated by occasional wintry
storms.
Yet by the
mid-20th century, of course, the two nations were staunch allies,
fighting together in the two World Wars (yes, the US began each war officially
neutral, but in each case we were aiding the UK’s
cause long
before we militarily joined it) and subsequently enjoying a so-called “special
relationship” that has continued to this day. The late 19th and
early 20th century shift that led to this new and enduring
relationship has been studied by historians of both nations for many years, and
has come to be known as The
Great Rapprochement (a term perhaps first coined by historian Bradford
Perkins in his 1968 book of the same name). As the many cartoons, lithographs,
and other primary documents collected at
this site illustrate, the shift was recognized on both sides of the
Atlantic while it was happening, and was folded into many other narratives of
the two nations’ expanding turn of the century identities, concurrent imperialistic
ventures, and other social and cultural trends.
There was no
single factor in that multi-decade rapprochement, but I would argue that tying
it to those imperialistic endeavors is of particular importance. The first test
of the two nations’ newfound friendship, after all, came during the Spanish
American War; most
European nations sided with their fellow colonial power, but England
opted for their new ally, a choice that certainly contributed to the
eventual American triumph in that conflict. Perhaps as a quid pro quo, and
perhaps as just another reflection of the new relationship, the U.S. likewise sided
with the U.K. during the bloody and controversial Second
Boer War. It’s tempting, and not I would argue inaccurate, to tie these
turn of the 20th century imperial alliances to the two nations’
leading roles in the early 21st century Iraq War, as well as the
effects of both British
and American influences on and presences in a nation like Afghanistan. But even
leaving such contemporary connections aside, the role that imperialism played
in bringing together the US and the UK is hugely telling of how the nations
moved together into their 20th century and ongoing identities and
roles.
Next thaw
tomorrow,
Ben
PS. What do you
think? Other thaws you’d highlight?
PPS. My colleague and friend Irene Martyniuk shares the following thoughts by email:
ReplyDelete"I would throw in two points. The 1956 Suez Canal Crisis was a real big moment for Britain. As far as I learned, which was not much, I admit, the Brits really believed that the Americans would have their six and were shocked when America opted to not get involved. If WWII hadn’t made it clear, this moment did—the US was a super power and Britain, on her own, was not.
I would add in that the Brits in Afghanistan since 2001, with their service ending in 2014, has been a different experience than the tenure of the Americans. It is one that can be tracked in their soldiers’ memoirs, which basically have a set formula (I actually picked up 7 more while overseas last week—they are short, always paperback, and thus light—and rather inexpensive). While there is much to say about this formula, one aspect of the Brit experience is that the Afghans have not forgotten the three Afghan-British Wars. Not by a longshot. The attitudes towards the different groups of NATO and ISAF are really interesting to follow, if you are into that sort of thing.
I totally understand that Iraq is an entirely different and unpleasant story, but going into Afghanistan is more, I would suggest, than just Britain and America. It has been the only time, as we both know, that Article 5 of NATO has been invoked, so there were obligations from all member nations to go. ISAF ended up, at its peak, having somewhere around 56 member nations."