On why
remembering history and recognizing reality are intricately intertwined.
In the aftermath
of Osama Bin Laden’s death, I
wrote a post about what it would mean for us to better remember the complex
and even disturbing histories of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, and the United States—and
why, whatever it might mean, it’s vitally important for us to try to do so. And
that’s not just because it’s always better to remember the past as fully and
with as much accuracy and nuance as possible (although that is one of this blog’s
slogans); it’s also because our too often over-simplified and even mythologized
narratives in the present depend precisely on the absence of such historical knowledge
and perspective. I don’t intend to suggest that Bin Laden was ever in the same
category as Nelson Mandela; but on the other hand, as I wrote in Tuesday’s
post, in one very definite way he was: both were defined as terrorists on the
US Watch List. And of course, at a certain point in their histories, both were
supported by the US in their fights against oppressive powers.
To paraphrase my favorite film psychotherapist,
a little advice about history, kiddo: don’t expect it always to tickle. When it
comes to the history of the American relationship with Iran, laughs are in
similarly short supply. That history goes back well into the 19th
century, but the modern version really began with the
CIA-orchestrated 1953 coup d’etat that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad
Mossadeq and replaced him with the dictatorial Shah
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The Shah’s brutal quarter-century rule of Iran was
thus, in a very significant way, directly caused by the US; and our government
consistently supported his regime through those years. Thus, while the
1979 revolution that replaced the Shah with Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Khomeini was indeed itself violent and repressive, it represented a change in
only one truly striking way: from a pro-American to an anti-American Iranian
government. All complex histories that need far more depth and analysis, of
course—but even a preliminary engagement with them offers a very different lens
on the
Iranian hostage crisis, the US alliance with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, and,
most saliently, our
current and ongoing negotiations with the Iranian government.
As with any shift
in our historical understanding, better remembering these histories wouldn’t
necessarily lead to any one position on that current issue and debate. But at
the very least, it would help—indeed, force—us to see Iran not as a caricatured
evil empire or adversary but as a nation with a history as long, multi-part,
and complex as our own; and as,
moreover, one with whose histories we have long been intertwined, and vice
versa. In addition, recognizing those realities would likewise force us to
recognize the
nation’s current size and diversity, its breadth of communities
and identities, the ways in which it can no more be reduced to the
Ayatollah or any single figure or attitude than the US could to our president
or our extremists. Would recognizing these historical and contemporary
realities make it more difficult for many American leaders and pundits to argue
for aggressive sanctions and/or military action against Iran? Given how much war
and its arguments depend on simplified and mythologized narratives, past
and present, I can’t help but think that it would.
Final 2013 event
tomorrow,
Ben
PS. What do you
think? Other 2013 events you’d remember?
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